Q1 2023: State of the Market with Co-Founder and Principal, Michael Becker

Q1'23 State of the Market

Written by Michael Becker
Q1 2023 Newsletter


Michael Becker Here...

As the winter season comes to an end and spring is now upon us, at SPI Advisory, we’re doing a bit of "Spring Cleaning" ourselves. Although we started this process a long time ago, we’re just now on the tail end of accomplishing a complete reposition of our apartment portfolio. "As I discussed in the Q4'22 Newsletter," back in 2017, we set out to sell our older workforce housing assets as the cap rate spread between Class A & Class B/C properties converged and fundamentals no longer supported buying older assets. At one point in time, SPI had dozens of workforce housing properties in our portfolio… but, today, only 3 remain, which we intend to hold long term due to their superior performance.

Part of our "Spring Cleaning" also includes refinancing & reinforcing the capital structures of our current assets to ensure that we’re able to easily transition back to riding the tailwinds of the capital markets once rising interest rates start to show signs of decline. As of recent, we’ve successfully completed several refinances and have additional refinances either actively in process, or under strong consideration.

Let me expand a bit on our thought process behind this . . .

At the onset of our career, in 2013/2014, we exclusively financed our portfolio with 10-year fixed-rate agency debt (Fannie/Freddie). At the time, we thought it was a great idea to get 10-year fixed rates in the low-5’s with 1-year of interest only ("IO") followed by 9 years on a 30-year amortization with a loan that was assumable. Then, we found out that there was the option of a 12-year fixed rate with 3 years of IO, so we signed on a ton of those. In hindsight, we thought that this debt structure would be accretive to us when we went to sell, as we expected the buyer would see the loan as an asset and pay up for the right to assume it. However, as 10-year treasury rates fell over the years to a striking 0.5% in August 2020, the exact opposite happened.

All those loans came with a Yield Maintenance prepayment structure, an equation that essentially protects the lender’s interest by placing the responsibility of lost interest income on the borrower.

YIELD MAINTENANCE = Present Value of Remaining Payments on the Loan X (Interest Rate - Treasury Yield)

In a nutshell, there are two standard components that determine Yield Maintenance premiums, the first being time: as a loan approaches maturity, the Present Value ("PV") of the remaining loan payments decreases, and therefore, so does the prepayment penalty. The second factor contrasts the loan’s interest rate to the comparable market treasury rate: if current treasury rates are lower, your prepayment penalty will be higher, and, conversely, if treasury interest rates are higher, the prepayment penalty will be lower. The lender must replace that income stream to make them whole, so the lower the interest rates, the more bonds they need to purchase to equal the same income stream, and, conversely, if rates are higher, you can purchase fewer bonds to replace that income stream.

As a direct result of the lending decisions that we made early on, we ended up paying 10s of Millions of dollars in Yield Maintenance to pay off the loans for the deals that we sold in 2015-2021, the worst of which was 23% of the total mortgage balance. While at the end of the day we were still able to produce exceptional returns for our investors on these deals, in my mind, these experiences revealed that the phenomena of “knowing” and “understanding,” while similar, are not the same… Both are distinct mental states involving different forms of cognitive grasp: “knowing” is passive and refers to the recollection of discrete facts, while “understanding” is active and describes the ability to assign meaning and context to those facts to form the big picture. In 2013, I knew what Yield Maintenance was, but today I truly understand what Yield Maintenance is.

I say all of this to provide you with some context on how we’re strategizing our approach to the refinances that we’re currently pursuing, because taking on a 10-year fixed rate isn’t as much of an “obvious choice” as it used to be simply due to the prepayment structures attached. Today, we have a variety of debt on the multifamily assets we own, both floating & fixed. Most of our deals have longer-term maturities, even if they float, however, we do have several maturing before the end of 2023. We’re taking somewhat of a “mixed bag” approach, but, in general, we’re seeking middle-ground solutions. Below are some examples of the tactics we're employing:

In February of this year, we closed on two refinances of existing Freddie Mac "Floaters" that we took on back in August 2020. We had plenty of term left on these loans, however, the interest rate cap that we purchased was set to expire in September 2023 and would’ve been more expensive to repurchase then. So, in December 2022, we signed the terms for a refinance going floating to floating with Freddie Mac. The main benefit of this refinance was being able to:

  • Lower our loan spread from the high-2’s over LIBOR to the low-2’s over SOFR,
  • Purchase a 2-year high-2’s rate cap for an all-in rate of 5%,
  • Increase monthly cash flow which had previously been depleted by escrows as a result of the lender increasing the max strike rate on the replacement cap they escrow for up to ~5%,
  • Cover the refinance transaction cost as the new loan amounts were higher than the old loans, &
  • De-risk our deals by taking the interest rate risk off the table for 2 years into Q1 2025, which we believe is more than enough time to get to the backside of the current Federal Reserve tightening cycle. (Of course, time will tell if this is correct or not).

In addition, we’re currently working on 2 supplementary refinances and exploring several others that have a similar 5–7-year fixed rate structure with flexible prepayments. The main benefits of this type of structure are being able to:
  • Take out loans with an upcoming maturity and extending them out 5 or more years, which we believe is more than sufficient time to overcome the economic uncertainty we’re currently facing, and ultimately de-risks our deals,
  • Focus our attention on the operations of the assets rather than the capital markets, and, instead of purchasing an expensive interest rate cap, using that capital for other uses such as distributions, &
  • Refinance or sell without a large penalty. Of most important note, we have flexible prepays on both and for the first 2-years they are locked-out from prepay, but starting in year 3, they can be prepaid with a Step-Down prepayment penalty... So, if rates drop quickly in the next year or two, we won’t be penalized for a decade, like the first loans we did. And, on the other hand, if rates stay elevated, we have a fixed rate to protect against that.

Any new opportunities that we’re underwriting today are also going to have one of the two above debt structure. We like to think of this strategy as "hedging the uncertainty but maintaining flexibility."

Speaking of new opportunities, we’re beginning to see more opportunities than we did in 2022. As of this newsletter, largely, we’re only seeing developers willing to meet the market pricing. The deals selling today had cost structures form 2 years ago, which are significantly lower than today’s replacement cost. I understand that generic Texas Multifamily replacement cost ranges between $220-230K/door for your average garden construction property and $240-250K/door for your average wrap construction deal. Developers can sell below current replacement cost, but still make a profit, which the merchant developers are willing to do by and large.

The second group willing to meet today’s market pricing are large institutional owners in REIT structures like Blackstone or Cortland. These firms are willing to meet current market pricing to provide liquidity for their investors. For example, Blackstone marketed over a dozen assets across the Sunbelt (several in Texas) at the beginning of 2023. With such little competition for sale, they received considerable interest in each of those assets; it’s my understanding that they received more than 20 bids/asset. This competition kept trailing cap rates a bit lower than you might have expected given the current interest rates. It’s also my understanding that these deals all traded with a mid-to-high 4 handle on the cap rates, but, with rent growth & some bad debt issues rolling off their financials, buyers are underwriting to mid-5’s for the cap rate in the first year or so.

Largely, we haven’t seen many workforce owners willing to meet today’s market pricing where buyers are generally requiring north of a 5-cap approaching 6 or better for the lesser-located and lesser-quality deals. The deals currently trading in the workforce space were purchased pre-COVID, in 2019 or before, and have greatly benefitted from an increased profit resulting from the 30-40% increase in rental rates that materialized post-COVID. Generally, workforce deals purchased post-COVID with bridge debt, are being harmed the most by the recent expansion of cap rates in this segment.

I’m starting to see the first cracks appear in the workforce space. I’ve seen a few deals floating around from a large owner of workforce housing in Texas (who I will not name), that was very aggressive with bridge debt fund financing & preferred equity that went very heavy paying low cap rates on a lot of deals in 2021 & early 2022… One of which they are willing to take 10-15% less than what they purchased the deal for in May/June 2022, which would have been peak pricing when the deal was awarded in March/April 2022. Honestly, I think they’re smart to take the first-loss approach vs. holding out for better times while their debt structure likely won’t allow for them to see the backside of this cycle anyways, and workforce values are likely going to get cheaper before they get more expensive, IMHO.

These conditions are what I think is the leading edge for more opportunities to come in the workforce housing space towards the end of 2023 and moving into 2024 (read my article in the Q4'22 newsletter for my detailed thoughts on this). We at SPI are preparing to take advantage of these opportunities in the workforce space as soon as they present themselves. There’s an excess of liquidity on the sidelines, and this proposition is quickly becoming the consensus market opinion; so, it’s still uncertain on how long or deep these opportunities will persist when it all plays out… We hope to be aggressive and active when these “Deals” present themselves, as we know very well that what might be here today might also be gone tomorrow. In the meantime, we’re continuing to tidy up and finishing our "Spring Cleaning," so that we’re ready when the time comes.

 

Cheers,

Michael Becker Signature
 
 
 

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